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On a Relationship between the Correct Probability
of Estimation from Correlated Data and Mutual
Information
Yasutada Oohama
Abstract—Let X , Y be two correlated discrete random vari-
ables. We consider an estimation of X from encoded data ϕ(Y )
of Y by some encoder function ϕ(Y ). We derive an inequality
describing a relation of the correct probability of estimation and
the mutual information between X and ϕ(Y ). This inequality
may be useful for the secure analysis of crypto system when we
use the success probability of estimating secret data as a security
criterion. It also provides an intuitive meaning of the secrecy
exponent in the strong secrecy criterion.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the mutual information is a very
important quantity for an evaluation of the security of commu-
nication system. In the crypto system introduced by Shannon
[1] perfect secrecy is defined by the condition that the mutual
information between secret data and encrypted data vanishes.
In the wiretap channel investigated by Wyner [2] and in
the broadcast channel with confidential messages investigated
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3], perfect secrecy is defined by an
asymptotically vanishing mutual information rate per channel
use between the secret messages and the channel outputs
obtained by the unauthorized user.
In the several recent researches on the information theo-
rytical security, the strong secrecy condition where the value
of mutual information should asymptotically be zero is well
used. Specifically, Hayashi [4] has derived the relevant secrecy
exponent function to specify the exponentially decreasing
speed (i.e., exponent) of the leaked information under the
average secrecy criterion when no cost constraint is considered.
Han et al.[5] extend his result to the case with cost constraint.
The secrecy condition used by Wyner [2] and Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [3] now called the weak secrecy condition has a clear
intuitive meaning that the leak of inforamtion rate on the secret
messages is asymptotically zero. On the other hand in the
strong secrecy criterion the intuitive meaning of the secrecy
exponent function does not seem to be so clear.
In this paper we consider a problem which is related to
the intuitive meaning the secrecy exponent. Our problem is
as follows. Let X , Y be two correlated discrete random
variables. We consider an estimation of X from encoded
data ϕ(Y ) of Y by some encoder function ϕ(Y ). We derive
an inequality describing a relation of the correct probability
of estimation and the mutual information between X and
ϕ(Y ). This inequality may be useful for the secure analysis
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Fig. 1. The case where the side information ϕ(Y ) helps an estimation of X
from φ(X).
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Fig. 2. The case where only one side information is avairable at the estimater
and the case where no information is avairable at the estimater.
of crypto system when we use the success probability of
estimating secret data as a security criterion. It also provides an
intuitive meaning of the secrecy exponent in the strong secrecy
criterion.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESULTS
A. Data Estimation from Correlated Data
Let X and Y be discrete sets. We admit the case where those
are countably infinite. Let (X,Y ) be a disrete random pair
taking vaules in X × Y and having a probability distribution
pXY = {pXY (x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y
We consider a source estimation system depicted in Fig. 1.
Data sequences X and Y are separately encoded to φ(X) and
ϕ(Y ) and those are sent to the information processing center.
At the center the estimater ψ observes (φ(X), ϕ(Y ) to output
the estimation Xˆ of X . The encoder functions φ and ϕ are
defined by
φ : X →M = { 1, 2, · · · , |M|} ,
ϕ : Y → L = { 1, 2, · · · , |L|} .
}
(1)
The estimater ψ is defined by
ψ :M×L→ X . (2)
2The error probability of estimation is
Pe(φ, ϕ, ψ|pXY ) = Pr
{
Xˆ 6= X
}
, (3)
where Xˆ = ψ(φ(X), ϕ(Y )). The correct probability of esti-
mation is
Pc(φ, ϕ, ψ|pXY ) = 1− Pe(φ, ϕ, ψ|pXY ) = Pr
{
Xˆ = X
}
.
(4)
We condsier the following three cases.
1. The case where the side information ϕ(Y ) serves as a
helper to estimate X from φ(X).(Case 1)
2. The case where only the helper ϕ(Y ) is avairable for an
estimation of X .(Case 2) Case 2 corresponds to the case
where |M| = 1 and φ is a constant function given by
φ(x) = 1, x ∈ X . The decoder function ψ in this case
is given by ψ : L → X .
3. The case where no information is avairable for an
estimation of X .(Case 3) Case 3 corresponds to the
case where |M| = |L| = 1 and φ and ϕ are constant
functions given by φ(x) = 1, x ∈ X and ϕ(y) =
1, y ∈ Y . The decoer function ψ in this case is given by
ψ : {1} → X .
Let the correct probability of estimation in Case 2 is denoted
by Pc(ϕ, ψ|pXY ). Let the correct probability of estimation in
Case 3 is denoted by Pc(ψ|pXY ). Set
P(1)c,max(pXY )
△
= max
φ:X→M,
ϕ:Y→L,
ψ:M×L→X
Pc(ϕ, ψ|pXY ),
P(2)c,max(pXY )
△
= max
ϕ:Y→L,
ψ:L→X
Pc(ϕ, ψ|pXY ),
P(3)c,max(pXY )
△
= max
ψ:{1}→X
Pc(ψ|pXY ).
Our aim is to clarify relationships between the above three
quantities. By definition it is obvious that
P(1)c,max(pXY ) ≥ P
(2)
c,max(pXY ) ≥ P
(3)
c,max(pXY ).
Set
pmax
△
= max
x∈X
pX(x).
Then we have
P(3)c,max(pXY ) = max
ψ:{1}→X ,
x∈X :ψ(1)=x
pX(x)
= max
ψ(1)∈X
pX(ψ(1)) = pmax.
We are particularly interested in a difference between P(2)c,max(
pXY ) and P(3)c,max(pXY ). If there is no difference between
those to quantities. The side information ϕ(Y ) is of no use
to estimate X . In this paper we derive an inequality stating
that the difference is upper bounded by the mutual information
between the side information ϕ(Y ) and the source X .
B. Main Results
In this subsection we sate our main result. We first give a
proposition which plays a key role in deriving our main results.
Set S = ϕ(Y ). The joint distribution pXY of (X,Y, S) is given
by
pXY S(s, x, y) = pXY (x, y)pS|Y (s|y).
It is obvious that the random variables X,Y, S form Markov
chain X ↔ Y ↔ S. The following proposition providing
an upper bound of P(0)c,max(pXY ) is useful to derive our main
result.
Proposition 1: For any η > 0 and for any (φ, ϕ, ψ), we
have
Pc(φ, ϕ, ψ|pXY )
≤ pSX
{
log |M| ≥ log
1
pX|S(X |S)
− η
}
+ 2−η.
Specifically, we have
P(1)c,max(pXY )
≤ pSX
{
log |M| ≥ log
1
pX|S(X |S)
− η
}
+ 2−η.
Proof of this proposition is given in the next section. Using
this proposition, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1: For any ν ∈ (0, log 1pmax ), we have
P(2)c,max(pXY ) ≤ 2ν(pmax) +
1
ν
I(X ;ϕ(Y )). (5)
Proof of this theorem is given in the next section. From
Theorem 1 and 2ν ≤ 1 + ν for ν ∈ [0, 1], we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 1: For any ν ∈ (0,min{1, log 1pmax }), we have
P(2)c,max(pXY ) ≤ (1 + ν)pmax +
1
ν
I(X ;ϕ(Y )).
III. PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
In this section we prove Proposition 1 and Theorem 1. We
first prove Proposition 1. To prove this proposition, we prepare
a lemma. Set
D
△
= {(s, x, y) : s = ϕ(y), pX|S(x|s) ≥ (1/|M|)2−η},
E
△
= {(s, x, y) : s = ϕ(y), ψ(φ(x), ϕ(y)) = x}.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1:
pSXY (D
c ∩ E) ≤ 2−η.
Proof: We first observe that
pS(s) =
∑
y:ϕ(y)=s
pY (y), pY |S(y|s) =
pY (y)
pS(s)
.
3We have the following chain of inequalities:
pSXY (D
c ∩ E)
=
∑
s∈L
pS(s)
∑
y:ϕ(y)=s
pY |S(y|s)
×
∑
x:ψ(s,φ(x))=x
pX|S(x|s)<(1/|M|)2−η
pX|Y (x|y)
=
∑
s∈L
pS(s)
∑
x:ψ(s,φ(x))=x
pX|S(x|s)<(1/|M|)2−η
pX|S(x|s)
≤
∑
s∈L
pS(s)
1
|M|
2−η |{x : ψ(s, φ(x)) = x}|
(a)
≤
∑
s∈L
pS(s)
1
|M|
2−η|M| = 2−η.
Step (a) follows from that the number of x ∈ X correctly
decoded does not exceed |M|.
Proof of Proposition 1: By definition we have
pSXY (D) = pSX
{
log |M| ≥ log
1
pX|S(X |S)
− η
}
.
Hence, it suffices to show
Pc(φ, ϕ, ψ|pXY ) ≤ pSXY (D) + 2−η
to prove Proposition 1. By definition we have
Pc(φ, ϕ, ψ|pXY ) = pSXY (E) .
Then we have the following.
Pc(φ, ϕ, ψ|pXY ) = pSXY (E)
= pSXY (D ∩ E) + pSXY (D
c ∩ E)
≤ pSXY (D) + pSXY (D
c ∩ E)
(a)
≤ pSXY (D) + 2−η.
Step (a) follows from Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: We have the following chain of
inequalities:
P(1)c,max(pXY )
(a)
≤ pSX
{
0 ≥ log
1
pX|S(X |S)
− η
}
+ 2−η
= pSX
{[
log
1
pX|S(X |S)
≤ η
]
⋂[
log
pX|S(X |S)
pX(X)
< ν
]}
+ pSX
{[
log
1
pX|S(X |S)
≤ η
]
⋂[
log
pX|S(X |S)
pX(X)
≥ ν
]}
+ 2−η
≤ pX
{
log
1
pX(X)
< η + ν
}
+ pSX
{
log
pX|S(X |S)
pX(X)
≥ ν
}
+ 2−η
(b)
≤ pX
{
log
1
pX(X)
< η + ν
}
+
1
ν
EpSX
[
log
pX|S(X |S)
pX(X)
]
+ 2−η
= pX
{
log
1
pX(X)
< η + ν
}
+
1
ν
I(X ;S) + 2−η. (6)
In step (a) we use Proposition 1 for |M| = 1. Step (b) follows
from the Markov’s inequality. In (6), we choose η, ν so that
η + ν = log
1
pmax
= min
x∈X
log
1
pX(x)
.
Since
η = −ν + log
1
pmax
> 0,
ν must satisfy ν ∈ (0, log 1pmax ), For this chooice of η, ν, we
have
pX
{
log
1
pX(X)
< η + ν
}
= 0, 2−η = 2ν(pmax). (7)
From (6) and (7), we have the bound (5) in Theorem 1.
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